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Abstract 
Mobile applications (apps) have become highly popular and are creating new economic 
opportunities for app providers, developers, software companies, and advertisers. Due 
to the access to personal information, mobile apps may pose a threat to users’ privacy, 
which can incite users not to install or to uninstall mobile apps. In the last twenty years, 
concerns for information privacy (CFIP) have been investigated by several studies, 
which adapted CFIP to an online and to a mobile context. Our extended approach for 
mobile users’ information privacy concerns (MUIPC) analyzes four dimensions of access 
to personal information, i.e., personal identity, location, device content, and system and 
network settings. By conducting an online survey with 474 participants, we test the 
influence of these dimensions on MUIPC with a structural equation model (SEM). Three 
dimensions are found to be significantly influential. The results are discussed and 
implications for research and practice are given. 
Keywords: Mobile applications, access to personal information, privacy concerns, 
online survey, multivariate analysis methods 
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Introduction 
Since the widespread adoption of mobile devices such as smartphones and tablet computers, mobile 
applications (apps) have become highly popular and are creating new economic opportunities for app 
providers, developers, software companies, and advertisers (Anthes 2011). According to ABI Research 
(2012), mobile apps will continue to generate revenues from pay-per-download, in-app purchase, 
subscriptions, and in-app advertising, growing from $8.5 billion in 2011 to $46 billion in 2016. However, 
the use of mobile apps is often associated with privacy concerns (Keith et al. 2012; Soper 2012; Xu et al. 
2012a). In this context, mobile access to personal information and related privacy concerns have been 
discussed by several researchers (e.g., Enck 2011; Najjar and Bui 2012). To make full use of their potential, 
mobile apps need to access certain functions. For example, the Google Maps mobile app requests access to 
the Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver of mobile devices to provide users with its navigation system, 
and as a result, a user’s location is exposed. While this function is fundamental for the functioning of the 
navigation system of the Google Maps mobile app, access is requested unnecessarily in a number of cases 
(Enck 2011). Access to personal information, i.e., personal identity, location, device content, and system 
and network settings, can incite users not to install or to uninstall mobile apps. In a survey of 714 mobile 
app users, the Pew Research Center found that 54% of the respondents had decided not to install and 30% 
had decided to uninstall mobile apps due to privacy concerns about their personal information (Pew 
Internet 2012). Mobile users fear their personal information might be misused by malicious apps, which 
are predicted to proliferate quickly on mobile platforms (Leavitt 2011). 
Like with Google Android version 4.2.2 (Jelly Bean), iOS 6 mobile apps ask for permission to access users’ 
personal information. In contrast to Android, iOS 6 users can turn off access in the privacy settings. As a 
reaction to mobile users’ privacy concerns, Apple recently changed the privacy settings with the release of 
iOS 6 (Apple 2013). This change implies that not only can mobile users turn off access to location, they 
can also restrict access to contacts, calendars, reminders, photos, Bluetooth sharing, and access to Twitter 
and Facebook accounts if supported by the mobile app. App providers face the challenge of both 
considering privacy concerns of their users and implementing measures to alleviate those concerns. 
Therefore, it is important to examine the balance of information privacy concerns with the advantages of 
location-based services (Bélanger and Crossler 2011) and other advantages derived from access to 
personal information. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how access to personal information affects mobile users’ 
information privacy concerns (MUIPC). MUIPC is measured using three dimensions: perceived 
surveillance, perceived intrusion, and secondary use of personal information (Xu et al. 2012a). Following 
Smith et al. (1996), Stewart and Segars (2002) called for research investigating antecedents and 
consequences of information privacy concerns. In our study, we focus on access to personal information 
as an antecedent to mobile users’ privacy concerns. This approach attempts to offer recommendations for 
app providers to better address the challenge of reducing users’ concerns for information privacy when 
they wish to install and use mobile apps. 
Against this backdrop, the article focuses on the following. First, we identify various types of access to 
personal information that might affect mobile users’ privacy concerns. Second, we offer an 
operationalization of access to personal information in order to measure the influence on MUIPC. Third, 
we propose and test a causal model on the relationship between access to personal information and 
MUIPC. This paper makes a theoretical contribution by conceptualizing that mobile users’ privacy 
concerns are noticeably affected by access to their personal information. An increasing number of studies 
within IS research investigate mobile app security and privacy. However, a review of the literature 
suggests that the influence of access to personal information on mobile users’ privacy concerns has not yet 
been addressed. This paper aims to fill this research gap. We explore the following research question: 
Which type of access to personal information has a major influence on mobile users’ privacy concerns? 
This paper is structured as follows: first, we give a holistic literature review on the field of mobile 
applications and outline identified types of access to personal information. After presenting the generated 
hypotheses, we describe the research design and report the results of our field study of mobile users who 
regularly use mobile apps. Following the discussion of our findings, we give implications for research and 
practice. Finally, limitations and conclusions are presented. 
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Foundations, Conceptual Basis, and Hypotheses Generation 
Mobile Applications and the Role of Mobile Application Security and Privacy in 
Information Systems Research 
To give a holistic overview of the current research in the mobile application area, a literature review was 
conducted on the six major IS research databases: ACM, AISeL, IEEE, Science Direct, EBSCOhost, and 
SpringerLink. We used “mobile application” as a search keyword (and also “mobile applications”, “mobile 
apps”, and “mobile app”), and intensively analyzed the literature for relevance. Mobile apps are a 
relatively new topic in IS research, and there are two dominant streams in this area: mobile application 
development and mobile application security and privacy. Literature in the field of mobile application 
development focuses on the mobile operating systems Apple iOS and Google Android (e.g., Bergvall-
Kåreborn et al. 2010; Gavalas and Economou 2011; Qiu et al. 2011). Bergvall-Kåreborn et al. (2010) 
outline benefits and drawbacks of Apple and Google from the developers’ point of view by interviewing 49 
iOS and Android developers. Another qualitative study conducted by Qiu et al. (2011) identifies and 
analyzes ideation, execution, and marketing as app developers’ entrepreneurial areas. Further research in 
this field compares various runtime environments such as Java ME, .NET Compact Framework, Flash 
Lite, and Android, which, for example, are reviewed by Gavalas and Economou (2011). Golding and 
Donaldson (2009) adapt the design science paradigm for the development of mobile apps, and there is 
literature dealing with design characteristics of mobile apps (e.g., compatibility and functionality) and 
how they affect attitudes toward and adoption of mobile apps (Hu et al. 2012; Kim 2012). 
The other stream in the mobile application area, mobile application security and privacy, often deals with 
location-based services. For example, Keith et al. (2010) discuss ethical aspects of the use of mobile apps 
with regard to personal location information. By means of an experiment with mobile app users, they 
conclude that location privacy concerns depend on location privacy assurance and the size of the base of 
app users. Xu et al. (2012b) focus more deeply on location privacy assurance, and empirically validate that 
privacy concerns are affected by a person’s perceived control over personal information. Other research 
investigates location information disclosure as an exchange of benefits and risks (e.g., Keith et al. 2012; 
Xu et al. 2010) based on the privacy calculus theory, which describes the willingness to provide personal 
information (see privacy calculus theory in Culnan and Armstrong 1999; Dinev and Hart 2006; Laufer 
and Wolfe 1977). In terms of the privacy calculus theory, Najjar and Bui (2012) develop a theoretical 
framework and link benefits and risks to perceived value, resulting in an intention to allow access to 
personal information. They focus on the benefits and risks of the use of mobile apps, and mention some of 
the personal information that can be accessed when someone downloads, installs, and uses mobile apps, 
such as the smartphone’s memory card, phone calls, messages, contact lists, user’s accounts, location 
information, etc. However, the access rights are not integrated into their proposed theoretical framework. 
The intention to allow access to personal information is often associated with permissions, which are 
divided into time-of-use and install-time (Enck 2011): “A time-of-use permission is approved by the user 
when the application executes a sensitive operation, e.g., iOS’s prompt to allow an application access to 
location. An install-time permission is approved by the user when the application is installed. For Android, 
this is the user’s only opportunity to deny access; the user must accept all permission requests or not 
install the application.” (p. 52). Enck (2011) further describes some of the permissions and discusses their 
necessity in the context of the danger for the users in allowing malicious mobile apps to access their 
personal information.  
In addition to these two streams, research in the mobile application area has focused on the success of 
mobile apps (e.g., Dhar and Varshney 2011; Ghose and Han 2012; Kajanan et al. 2012; Lee and Raghu 
2011; Liu et al. 2012), location-based services (e.g., Barbeau et al. 2011; Lehrer et al. 2011), online word-
of-mouth and trust (e.g., Hao et al. 2011; Yan et al. 2010), and user acceptance of mobile apps (e.g., Chen 
et al. 2012). Zhang et al. (2009) conducted a literature review on mobile apps and examined research 
methodology perspectives. They present a list of potential future research questions regarding relevant 
topics in the field of mobile applications. 
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Mobile Users’ Information Privacy Concerns (MUIPC) 
The MUIPC instrument was introduced by Xu et al. (2012a), and it is based on the scale of concern for 
information privacy (CFIP), developed and validated by Smith et al. (1996). An empirical confirmation of 
the CFIP scale’s reliability and validity by Stewart and Segars (2002) followed. Then, Malhotra et al. 
(2004) adapted the instrument to an online environment, developing the scale of Internet Users’ 
Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC). The investigation of information privacy concerns attributes to 
scholars’ efforts in trying to understand individuals’ assessment of benefits and risks to provide personal 
information to companies (e.g., Culnan and Armstrong 1999; Dinev and Hart 2006; Hui et al. 2007; Keith 
et al. 2012; Xu et al. 2010). A number of studies focused on the risks, particularly on privacy concerns. 
The CFIP scale measures “individuals’ concerns about organizational information privacy practices” with 
four subscales: collection, errors, unauthorized secondary use, and improper access (Smith et al. 1996, p. 
169). Collection describes individuals’ perception that “great quantities of data regarding their 
personalities, background, and actions are being accumulated” (Smith et al. 1996, p. 171). The collection of 
personal information enables companies to use this information about individuals in relationship 
marketing and to target offers more accurately to individuals’ interests (Culnan and Armstrong 1999). 
Due to errors and improper access, individuals become concerned that companies should take more 
measures to reduce errors and control access to personal information (Smith et al. 1996). With regard to 
companies’ potential opportunistic behaviors (Laufer and Wolfe 1977), unauthorized secondary use refers 
to the selling or sharing of a person’s information without their authorization (Smith et al. 1996). 
Referring to Malhotra et al. (2004), IUIPC draws on the social contract and justice theories, identifying 
three dimensions of privacy concerns: collection of personal information (distributive justice), control 
over personal information (procedural justice), and awareness of organizational information privacy 
practices (interactional and informational justice). 
Drawing on the communication privacy management theory, MUIPC theorizes privacy in the context of 
mobile users and presents three dimensions to measure mobile users’ privacy concerns: perceived 
surveillance, perceived intrusion, and secondary use of personal information. Perceived surveillance 
expands the collection factor from CFIP and IUIPC by mobile technology capabilities for tracking and 
profiling mobile users (Xu et al. 2012a). Mobile devices differentiate from other IS technologies, among 
other characteristics, because they are equipped with environment sensors such as GPS, integrated 
cameras, etc. (Enck 2011). Thus, these sensors enhance mobile users’ tasks, but otherwise evoke concerns 
about personal information. Surveillance is defined as “the watching, listening to, or recording of an 
individual’s activities” (Solove 2006, p. 490). According to Xu et al. (2012a), perceived intrusion implies 
access due to CFIP dimensions errors and improper access, as well as the control dimension in IUIPC. 
Solove (2006) defines intrusion as “invasions or incursions into one’s life,” which disturb “the victim’s 
daily activities, alters her routines, destroys her solitude, and often makes her feel uncomfortable and 
uneasy” (p. 549). Secondary use of personal information, which is also a dimension of CFIP, is defined as 
“the use of data for purposes unrelated to the purposes for which the data was initially collected without 
the data subject’s consent” (Solove 2006, p. 519). Secondary use is described as an asymmetry of 
knowledge, because individuals are exposed to the uncertainty that they are likely to know little or 
nothing about the circumstances under which their personal information is captured, sold, or processed, 
which creates “a sense of powerlessness and vulnerability” (Solove 2006, p. 519). 
Access to Personal Information 
Mobile users are faced with the decision to allow access to their personal information in order to use 
mobile apps. To gain a deeper insight into the different kind of access rights, we selected twelve popular 
mobile apps with an equal distribution of various categories: Facebook and Twitter (Social), Google Maps 
(Travel & Local), WhatsApp Messenger and Skype (Communication), Angry Birds and Fruit Ninja Free 
(Games), YouTube (Media & Video), Adobe Reader and Dropbox (Productivity), Google Search (Tools), 
and Shazam (Music & Audio). With regard to permissions, iOS asks for access to location services, 
contacts, calendars, reminders, photos, Bluetooth sharing, and access to the Twitter and Facebook 
account. For a more detailed view, we installed the selected apps and identified permissions using a 
Samsung Galaxy Nexus with Android version 4.2.2 (Jelly Bean). The analysis of the twelve apps resulted 
in a request for 56 permissions, of which we present the most common 17 permissions in Table 1 (six or 
more of the tested apps requested these permissions). 
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Table 1. List of Common Permissions 
Categories Permissions 
Phone calls Read phone status and identity 
Microphone Record audio 
Your location Approximate location (network-based) 
 Precise location (GPS and network-based) 
Your social information Read your contacts 
Storage Modify or delete the contents of your USB storage 
Your accounts Add or remove accounts 
 Find accounts on the device 
 Use accounts on the device 
Network communication Full network access 
 Receive data from Internet 
 View network connections 
 View Wi-Fi connections 
Affects Battery Control vibration 
 Prevent phone from sleeping 
Sync settings Read sync settings 
System tools Test access to protected storage 
 
The permissions are further described when tapped on, while some permissions point out that access may 
harm the user if the app is malicious. For example, permission to directly call phone numbers is requested, 
indicating that malicious apps may cost the user money by making calls without the user’s confirmation. 
Referring to the permission to read contacts, the user is advised that malicious apps may share contact 
data without the user’s knowledge. There are further similar permissions, e.g., relating to sending text 
messages, to receiving data from the Internet, or modifying system settings, which could cost the user 
money, cause excess data usage, or corrupt the user’s system configuration. 
Access to personal information can be perceived by individuals as an intrusion into their privacy and in 
general, access by mobile apps may pose a threat to users’ privacy (Najjar and Bui 2012). To consider the 
access to personal information in a more differentiated view, we categorize access to personal information 
into four dimensions: personal identity, location, device content, and system and network settings (see 
Figure 1). 
Mobile devices are considered to be “an expression of our personality” (Meschtscherjakov 2009) and 
contain comprehensive information about the user’s identity (e.g., name, contact information, phone 
number, etc.). The access to identity-related information can be of concern to users. For example, the Wall 
Street Journal examined 101 mobile apps, of which 56 transmitted the phone’s unique device ID to other 
companies without users’ awareness or consent (Thurm and Kane 2010). Mobile users can perceive a 
potential misuse of information that may result in identity theft leading to the selling or sharing of their 
personal identity information without their authorization (Keith et al. 2012; Najjar and Bui 2012). 
Retrieved identity-related information might be used for unwanted solicitations, more personalized spam 
email and junk mail (Keith et al. 2010). Personal identity forms the first dimension of access to personal 
information, and it indicates that mobile apps can identify the user and may send the user’s profile 
information to other entities. 
H1: Access to personal identity has a significant positive influence on MUIPC. 
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Figure 1. Research Model 
 
The second dimension describes access to users’ location. Location-based services (LBS) have attracted 
considerable attention due to the potential for personalized and context-aware services (Dhar and 
Varshney 2011). Access to location-related information allows mobile apps to get users’ approximate and 
precise location derived by location services using GPS or network location sources such as cell towers and 
Wi-Fi. LBS offer diverse benefits for personal purposes, for example, requesting driving directions to 
nearby gas stations, hotels, local airports, nearby attractions, or restaurants, as well as societal purposes 
like reducing traffic congestion, improving urban planning, arresting the spread of disease, or studying 
interpersonal interactions (Soper 2012). Companies like Google, Yahoo, Facebook, Foursquare, and many 
others use location information to provide value-added services to users (Xu et al. 2012b). However, LBS 
evoke mobile users’ privacy concerns, because their position is tracked, or they are spammed with mobile 
advertising (Keith et al. 2012). Hence, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: Access to location has a significant positive influence on MUIPC. 
Device content refers to information stored on mobile devices that may provide value for users in specific 
contexts. Allowing mobile apps to write to the storage of mobile devices implies the modification or 
deletion of the storage contents, which could result in unwanted intrusion. The storage often contains 
sensitive information such as contacts, photos, videos, calendar events, reminders, browser bookmarks 
and navigation history, etc. Integrated cameras are a standard feature of mobile devices, and with the 
permission of the user, mobile apps are allowed to take photos and videos with the camera at any time 
without confirmation. For example, mobile social networking apps use the camera of mobile devices, 
process photos and videos, transfer private messages from one user to another, etc., which is why users’ 
privacy is a serious challenge for app developers (Jabeur et al. 2013). Communication apps such as 
WhatsApp Messenger transfer sensitive text messages, and productivity apps like Dropbox have access to 
private files as well as sensitive company data that is stored on mobile devices. Giving mobile apps 
permission to read or modify calendar events and reminders also enables the apps to share or save this 
kind of data, regardless of confidentiality or sensitivity. Access to mobile browser’s bookmarks and 
navigation history allows mobile apps to read all of the browser’s bookmarks saved on the mobile device, 
as well as to read the history of all websites that the browser has visited. Thus, mobile apps can put 
content in a user-centered context, and process data such as user preferences, information needs, and 
personal time schedule (Zhang et al. 2009). Due to the confidentiality and sensitivity of mobile devices’ 
content, we hypothesize: 
H3: Access to device content has a significant positive influence on MUIPC. 
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The fourth dimension deals with system and network settings, which relate to configuration preferences 
for system components and network connections on mobile devices. System components include the 
configuration of several functions of the mobile device, e.g., vibration, alarm, or screen lock. With regard 
to network connections, the access allows mobile apps to view, change, and control network connections 
such as Wi-Fi connections, Near Field Communication (NFC), and Bluetooth. Mobile users benefit from 
networking standards like Wi-Fi, which provides fast internet connectivity, or short-range communication 
technologies such as NFC for services like mobile payment, or Bluetooth for data synchronization, headset 
applications, etc. However, access to network connections enables malicious apps to intercept and control 
users’ data (Leavitt 2011). Due to a potential risk of privacy intrusion through the access to system and 
network settings, we posit: 
H4: Access to system and network settings has a significant positive influence on MUIPC. 
Research Design and Methodology 
Survey Design 
Acknowledging the challenges associated with gaining acceptable empirical data in the critical domain of 
privacy concerns in the context of mobile applications, we chose the survey methodology to collect 
empirical data and multivariate analysis methods to test the revised model statistically. To increase 
content validity, the questionnaire was pre-tested twice. Two pilot studies were conducted among 
participants to assess the conciseness and clarity of the survey questions and instructions, and evaluate 
the measurement models. Participation in the study was completely voluntary, and in the final study 
incentives in the form of two $25 Amazon vouchers were offered. Offering incentives to subjects in 
exchange for participation is well applied in survey methodology (Xu et al. 2012b). In the first pilot study 
a total of 161 subjects participated, with 98 producing usable data (61 percent). In the second pilot study a 
total of 56 subjects participated, with 40 producing usable data (71 percent). Comments and opinions on 
the survey questions were collected and used to revise the final questionnaire and to modify several items, 
especially in their wording. Furthermore, as described by Johnston and Warkentin (2010), content 
validity for the instrument scales was established through a content validity expert panel comprised of ten 
doctoral and faculty students who were skilled in quantitative research methods and analysis. For the final 
study, with participants from the USA, we used two approaches to collect empirical data. First, we used 
online networking websites with an international focus (LinkedIn), Android and iOS forums, and 
American university groups on Facebook. We recruited participants by posting announcements on those 
websites. The posting provided some background information about the study and the subjects could 
easily participate by using the URL provided in the posting. Second, we contacted potential participants 
from the USA via email. In the final study a total of 775 subjects participated, with 474 producing usable 
data (61 percent), see Table A1, of which 61.4% use Apple iOS, 34.4% Google Android, 2.1% BlackBerry OS, 
and 1.3% Windows Phone. The remaining 0.8% of participants were using other operating systems that 
were not specified. The survey consists of closed-ended questions on a five-point Likert scale. The 
respondents were instructed to indicate how strongly they agree or disagree with a number of statements 
relating to their privacy concerns when using mobile apps and their feelings concerning the intrusion if 
mobile apps are able to access to different information, data, application, etc. (e.g., contact information, 
call logs, approximate location, and the browser’s navigation history). 
Measurement and Instrumentation 
Overall, seven constructs were measured in this study using five-point Likert scale items. Access to 
personal information, which is represented by Personal Identity (PERS_ID), Location (LOC), Device 
Content (DEV_CON), System and Network Settings (SYS_NET) as first-order factors as well as a second-
order MUIPC with three first-order dimensions: Secondary Use of Personal Information (SUSE), 
Surveillance (SURV), and Intrusion (INTR) (Xu et al. 2012a). By enabling the collection of complex 
concepts in comparatively simple abstractions, multidimensional constructs such as second-order 
constructs provide opportunities to advance research (Polites et al. 2012) and increase the realism in 
empirical models (Edwards 2001). While Smith et al. (1996) operationalize CFIP as a first-order construct, 
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Stewart and Segars (2002) as well as Angst and Agarwal (2009) demonstrated that CFIP was indeed a 
second-order phenomenon (Malhotra et al. 2004; Xu et al. 2012b). As mentioned by Jarvis et al. (2003), 
the historical roots of this type of model can be traced back to the work of Gerbing and Anderson (1984) 
and Bentler and Weeks (1980). The conceptualization in this manner avoids several problems in the 
interpretation of the role of MUIPC in the structural model. “Of course, some researchers might argue 
that a construct must be conceptually and empirically unidimensional to be meaningful,” nevertheless 
“such a view is often inconsistent with the way constructs are defined” (Jarvis et al. 2003, p. 204). If all 
indicators are bundled together, the explication of the construct is not complete (Gerbing et al. 1994) and 
finally it would be difficult to ascertain the contribution of each domain on the overall construct 
(Koufteros et al. 2009). This could be the case if, for example, all indicators are bundled together through 
just one first-order latent variable (Koufteros et al. 2009). Therefore, a first-order model with multiple 
factors makes it difficult for researchers to clearly interpret the relationship between MUIPC and the 
research variables of interest. However, the second-order model does not suffer from these problems. 
Furthermore, Xu et al. 2012a argue that “the second-order factor model represents the structure of 
MUIPC more parsimoniously than the first-order factor model” (p. 8). Therefore, we conceptualize 
MUIPC as a second-order construct, because it is theoretically sound, substantively meaningful, 
operationally convenient, and empirically justified.  
The constructs of access to personal information and MUIPC were multi-item scales partly drawn from 
previous validated measures. The constructs SUSE, SURV, and INTR (MUIPC) were measured by items 
adapted from Xu et al. (2012a), while PERS_ID, LOC, DEV_CON, and SYS_NET were measured by items 
based on a detailed analysis of access rights and privacy settings (iOS 6, Android version 4.2.2) and an 
extensive literature review. This is due to the fact that we could find no rigorously validated instrument 
that captured the constructs of access to personal information during our research. Since the construct of 
access to personal information was developed based on prior literature and theory, it was important to 
establish a proper factor structure of the construct. Due to the large number of indicators, we therefore 
first conducted an explorative factor analysis (EFA) as a dimensional reduction method using the 
principal component analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation as the extraction method. The total number of 
items was reduced based on four constructs: PERS_ID, LOC, DEV_CON, and SYS_NET, with a total of 25 
indicators (see Appendix Table A2). These constructs that represent the overall dimension of access to 
personal information, were expected to influence MUIPC. The component structure of MUIPC was also 
examined by means of a factor analysis. In the first implementation of the EFA, there were cross-loadings 
between two components for the item SURV1, so this was removed. After excluding SURV1, the results of 
the EFA show a very clean component structure in which discriminant and convergent validity are evident 
by the high loadings within components, and no cross-loadings between components that exceed 0.40; 
see Table 2. Cronbach’s Alpha was more than 0.7 for all seven constructs. All constructs ranged from 
minimum 0.807 to o.948, demonstrating that all constructs satisfied the criteria for adequate convergent 
validity (Nunnally 1978). 
Table 2. Results PCA using Varimax Rotation for MUIPC 
Construct Items 
  Component   
Cronbach’s Alpha 
1 2 3 
SUSE 
SUSE 1 .824 .296 .268 
.916 SUSE 2  .853 .236 .260 
SUSE 3 .865 .247 .262 
SURV 
SURV 2 .352 .392 .740 
.816 
SURV 3 .332 .325 .807 
INTR 
INTR 1 .227 .794 .281 
.855 INTR 2 .212 .861 .237 
INTR 3 .349 .734 .278 
Rotation Sum of 
Squared 
Loadings 
Total 2.608 2.373 1.619 
  % Variance 32.602 29.664 20.237 
Cumulative Variance 32.602 62.266 82.503 
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Furthermore, the potential for common method variance (CMV) should be addressed because the data 
was collected from a survey instrument (Chang et al. 2010; McElroy et al. 2007; Podsakoff and Organ 
1986) and in many empirical studies, CMV remains a critical methodological concern (Siemsen et al. 
2010). We tried to minimize these methodological concerns ex-ante in the research design stage and ex-
post in different ways: first, a number of procedural remedies were used in designing and administering 
the questionnaire to reduce the likelihood of CMV. The measures for the different constructs 
(independent and dependent variables) were collected from different sources (Chang et al. 2010). 
Furthermore, counterbalancing the order of questions in relation to different constructs makes CMV less 
likely. This is due to the fact that the participant cannot easily combine related indicators to cognitively 
create the correlation needed to produce a CMV-biased pattern of responses (Murray et al. 2005). 
Therefore, we implemented the online survey questionnaire in such way as to prevent participants from 
backtracking to change their answers. To achieve this, the pages of the survey items were presented in a 
random manner to discourage participants from figuring out the relationship between the predictor and 
criterion variable that we were trying to establish. Second, anonymity and confidentiality of the study 
were guaranteed (Chang et al. 2010). This also mitigated self-serving answers and the probability that 
respondents provided answers they believe were expected. These remedies can ex-ante reduce the 
likelihood of the consistency motive in participants’ responses and theory-in-use biases (Chang et al. 2010; 
Podsakoff et al. 2003). Third, this study employed Harman’s single-factor test (Podsakoff et al. 2003) to 
access the common method bias ex-post. The results of the EFA show that no single factor accounted for 
the covariance in the variables and no single factor emerged from the unrotated factor solution (Podsakoff 
et al. 2003). 
Data Analysis and Results 
In this section, following the description of the analysis, which includes, e.g., a description of instrument 
validity and an internal validity test, the results are described and further presented in a model (see 
Figure 2). Constructs that are the basic elements of a theory are not inherently reflective or formative and 
the choice of measurement rest on theoretical considerations (Centefelli and Bassellier 2009, Howell et al. 
2007). The measurement formulation depends on the direction of the relationship between the constructs 
and the corresponding manifest variables (Fornell and Bookstein 1982). We therefore captured the entire 
domain of the constructs and decided at the theoretical level whether the constructs in the underlying 
research field were reflective, formative, or a combination (MIMIC model) of the two previously 
mentioned models to ensure content validity. After examining the relationship between each indicator 
and the construct in the field of access to personal information and MUIPC, we determined the overall 
constructs in the research model to be reflective. In reflective measurement models, each variable is a 
function of the underlying factor and each manifest variable is assumed to measure a unique underlying 
concept (Esposito Vinzi et al. 2010).  
Empirical data was analyzed via structural equation modeling (SEM) to test the causal-effect relations 
among the latent constructs. SEM integrates the measurement and the structural model (hypothesized 
causal paths) into a simultaneous assessment (Gefen et al. 2011). Therefore, SEM provides researchers 
with the flexibility to model a relationship among criterion variables and multiple predictors, such as 
model errors in measurements for observed variables, to design unobservable latent variables, and 
statistically test a priori theoretical and measurement assumptions against empirical data (Chin 1998). 
Model testing and measurement validation were conducted using SmartPLS (partial least squares) version 
2.0.M3, a variance analytical SEM technique that utilizes a component-based approach to estimation. It is 
advantageous when the research model has a variety of indicators, is relatively complex, and the measures 
are not well-established (Fornell and Bookstein 1982).  
Before the overall model was analyzed, the reflective measurement models for access to personal 
information and MUIPC were analyzed. In this context, we examined item reliability, construct validity, 
composite reliability, and convergent and discriminant validity. To ensure item reliability, the loadings of 
each item were examined to their respective underlying construct. Acceptable item loadings are 
recommended to be above at least 0.6 and ideally above the threshold of 0.707, indicating that at least 50 
percent of the variance is shared with the respective construct (Chin 1998). The item reliability analysis of 
access to personal information and MUIPC shows that all items ranged from minimum 0.703 to o.939, 
demonstrating that all items are reliable for further analysis. The t-values ranged from 20.170 to 123.954, 
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which indicates significance for all item loadings at p < 0.001. In addition to the item reliability, the 
construct validity was checked by reviewing whether there were cross-loadings. In this study, no cross-
loadings were identified, which means that all indicators load on those constructs to which they were 
intended to load (Straub et al. 2004). The composite reliability or internal consistency reliability (ICR) is 
similar to Cronbach’s alpha and is used to measure the internal consistency, except that the latter 
presumes, a priori, that each indicator of a construct contributes equally (i.e., the loadings are set to unity) 
(Chin 1998; Fornell and Larcker 1981). The measure is superior to Cronbach’s alpha because it uses the 
actual indicator loadings obtained within the nomological network to calculate internal consistency 
reliability (Fornell and Larcker 1981). ICR, which is unaffected by scale length, is more general than 
Cronbach’s alpha, but the interpretation of the values obtained is similar and the guidelines offered by 
Nunnally can be adopted (Howell and Avolio 1993). The value for ICR should be 0.70 or higher 
(Diamantopoulos et al. 2008). The composite reliability (ICR) is above the threshold and the values range 
from o.8924 to 0.9548, so that the internal consistency reliability for all constructs is given. Discriminant 
and convergent validity was assessed by the average variance extracted (AVE). First, “discriminant 
validity can be established if item-to-construct correlations are higher with each other than with other 
construct measures and their composite values” (Johnston and Warkentin 2010, p. 557, Loch et al. 2003). 
Here, the condition for discriminant validity is met. Furthermore, the AVE estimate is the overall amount 
of variation that a latent construct is able to explain in the manifest or observed variables to which is 
theoretically related. The reported values provide evidence of discriminant and convergent validity, since 
the AVE is well above the recommended level of 0.50 (Bhattacherjee and Premkumar 2004). The AVE 
values for all constructs in this model are higher than the recommended threshold value of 0.50 (smallest 
AVE: 0.6052), suggesting the convergent validity of the scale (Bhattacherjee and Premkumar 2004). 
Overall, the evidence of reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity indicates that the 
measurement model was appropriate for testing the structural model at a subsequent stage. 
Table 3. Validity and Reliability Criteria 
Constructs Indicators Std. Loading t-value Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE) 
AVE(ξi) ≥ 0.5 
Composite 
Reliability (ICR) 
(ρ ≥ 0.7) 
INTR INTR 1 - 3 0.865 - 0.901 60.160 - 90.729 0.7752 0.9118 
SURV SURV 2 - 3  0.917 - 0.921 99.065 - 103.944 0.8448 0.9159 
SUSE SUSE 1 - 3  0.919 - 0.936 85.700 - 123.954 0.8559 0.9469 
DEV_CON DEV_CON 1 - 9 0.734 - 0.826 21.723 - 38.011 0.6052 0.9324 
PERS_ID PERS_ID 1 - 3 0.801 - 0.905 35.369 - 71.544 0.7348 0.8924 
LOC LOC 1 - 2  0.936 - 0.939 91.628 - 105.992 0.8792 0.9357 
SYS_NET SYS_NET 1 - 11  0.703 - 0.862 20.170 - 58.763 0.6585 0.9548 
INTR = Perceived Intrusion; SURV = Perceived Surveillance; SUSE = Secondary Use of Personal Information; 
DEV_CON = Device Content; PERS_ID = Personal Identity; LOC = Location; SYS_NET = System and Network 
Settings 
 
To receive valid results, the bootstrapping resampling procedure was used with 1000 resamples to obtain 
estimates of standard errors for testing the statistical significance of a path coefficient using the t-test. In 
this way, the analysis produced estimates of both the explained variance and path coefficients. Of the four 
hypotheses, all but one involving the influence of SYS_NET were found to be significant, as shown in the 
overall findings in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Overview of Findings 
Hypothesis (with direction) Path Coefficient (ß) t-value p-value Support 
H1: PERS_ID --> MUIPC (+) 0.249 5.592 p < 0.001 Supported 
H2: LOC --> MUIPC (+) 0.206 4.021 p < 0.001 Supported 
H3: DEV_CON --> MUIPC (+) 0.225 4.129 p < 0.001 Supported 
H4: SYS_NET --> MUIPC (+) -0.006 0.167 p > 0.10 Not supported 
 
As indicated in Figure 2, the model explains approximately 27 percent of the overall variance. This 
explanatory power of 27 percent are the paths from the constructs of access to personal information 
leading to MUIPC. Consistent with H1, PERS_ID has a significant positive effect on MUIPC (β = .249, p 
< .001). Similarly, H2 and H3 are supported as both LOC (β = .206, p < .001) and DEV_CON (β = .225, p 
< .001) have significant positive effects on MUIPC. 
Kirk (1996) argues that “statistical significance is concerned with whether a research result is due to 
chance of sampling variability; practical significance is concerned with whether a research result is useful 
in the real world.” (p. 746). Therefore, it is essential that we interpret the significance of the results not 
only statistically, but according to their real world or practical significance as well. For practical purposes 
it is the differential effects of the latent variables that are important and not primarily the statistical 
significance (B0ßow-Thies and Albers 2010). In order to examine the practical significance, the effect size 
referring to Cohen (1988) is calculated. Effect size measures have been offered as indices of 
meaningfulness or practical significance (Olejnik and Algina 2000; Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2004). Effect 
sizes have the advantages that they are independent of the sample size and that the measures of the effect 
sizes allow a direct comparison of different quantities measured, e.g., on different scales (Selya et al. 2012). 
As Kirk pointed out in 1996, “Cohen’s definitions of small, medium, and large effects represent a good 
beginning.” (p. 756), with respect to determining the practical significance. Cohen’s f² is one of several 
effect size measures to use in the context of multiple regression analysis (Chin et al. 2003; Cohen 1988). 
Next to the value of the path coefficients, the effect size f² is another measure of substantial effect of 
exogenous latent variables on the latent endogenous variable. f² then provides information about the size 
of the effects, although it has to be noted that a small f² does not necessarily imply an unimportant effect 
(Chin et al. 2003). It can thus also be used to illustrate the practical relevance of statistical significant 
results. The effect sizes are shown in Table 5.  
Table 5. Effect Size  
Latent variable being 
explained (endogenous) 
Explanatory latent 
variable (exogenous) R²incl. a R²excl. b f² 
MUIPC 
PERS_ID 0.270 0.221 0.067 
LOC 0.270 0.240 0.041 
DEV_CON 0.270 0.241 0.040 
SYS_NET 0.270 0.270 0 
a  R² of the latent variable being explained (endogenous), together with the explanatory latent variable (exogenous). 
b  R² of the latent variable being explained (endogenous), in the absence of the explanatory latent variable (exogenous). 
Note: Cohen’s f²-statistics = [R²incl. – R²excl.] / [1- R²incl.] (1988). f² ≥ 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 are termed small, medium, and large 
effect sizes. The rationale for these benchmarks (f²) can be found in Cohen (1988) on the following pages: pp. 413-414. 
 
Discussion and Recommendations 
This paper demonstrates that access to personal information is influential in determining mobile users’ 
information privacy concerns (MUIPC). Figure 2 shows the estimates of the path coefficients and a 
summary of the test results of research hypotheses. 
Access to personal identity is hypothesized to show a positive relation to MUIPC. Our results indicate a 
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positive significant relationship. Usually it is almost impossible for mobile users to avoid exposing 
information related to their identity. For example, platforms like Apple App Store, Google Play Store, and 
Windows Phone Store, where mobile apps usually are available, require users to register with at least a 
valid email address and further identity-related information like name, date of birth, gender, phone 
number, etc. Even if users try to avoid stating identity-related information or give fake information, their 
phone’s unique device ID cannot be changed or turned off (Thurm and Kane 2010), and it links any other 
information accessed by mobile apps to a user’s mobile device. Referring to the MUIPC dimension of 
intrusion, users may feel uncomfortable providing identity-related information to mobile apps. 
 
 
Figure 2. Results 
 
As hypothesized, the results indicate that access to location has a positive impact on MUIPC. Prior 
research stated that the disclosure of location is of great concern for mobile users. In particular, the 
surveillance dimension of MUIPC indicates that the tracking of mobile users’ location can be of concern. 
Due to the permission given to mobile apps, users’ activities are tracked wherever and whenever users are 
located. In the last few years, LBS has become a common feature of mobile apps. For example, Google 
Maps applies GPS and network location sources to provide users with street maps, satellite images, 
navigation assistance, a route planner for travelling by foot, car, bike, or with public transportation. Many 
other mobile apps offer LBS, such as check-in options on Facebook or Foursquare. Referring to the 
MUIPC dimension secondary use of personal information, location-related information could be used for 
purposes other than those expected and authorized by the user, e.g., location-based advertising, which 
could make the user feel uncomfortable. For example, since the launch of Google Street View, privacy 
concerns have been raised with the result that Google implemented an option to request removal of 
images (Mills 2007), later replacing it by an option to request blurring of images. As proposed by many 
researchers before, location is an essential factor in the context of mobile security and privacy. The results 
of our research model suggest that access to mobile users’ location affects mobile users’ privacy concerns. 
With regard to access to device content, the path coefficient is significantly positive in relation to MUIPC. 
The use of photos and videos has become very common on mobile devices. Access to such private data can 
be perceived as intrusive to users. In addition, photos and videos can include further information like 
when and where the photo or the video was taken, which can increase mobile users’ level of concern. 
Further content like contacts stored on mobile devices, including the frequency with which the user called, 
emailed, etc. can be accessed by mobile apps, revealing information that might trace to relatives, friends, 
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colleagues, acquaintances, etc. Calendars and reminders are another source of information, revealing 
users’ time schedules. For example, they contain information about when and where a user will perform 
which task. When mobile apps are given access to browser bookmarks and navigation history, detailed 
user web browsing behavior and web browsing preferences can be obtained. This information is especially 
useful for context-aware advertising. However, mobile users may perceive access to content as an 
intrusion into their privacy, and this was confirmed by our model testing. 
Eventually, the influence of access to system and network settings on MUIPC was not found to be 
influential (t-value 0.167). At first glance, it appears that settings do not relate to personal information. 
However, access to settings can give information on user behavior. For example, Shirazi et al. (2013) 
developed a mobile app to track users sleep behavior by implementing a social alarm clock. It allowed 
mobile apps to access the alarm of mobile devices, giving information on users’ routines, which could 
make them feel uncomfortable due to perceived privacy intrusion. Synchronization settings and statistics 
show the history of synchronization events and how much data is synchronized, which is another pattern 
of user behavior. Allowing mobile apps to retrieve running apps reveals information about which apps are 
used on the mobile device. Regarding network settings, the using of Wi-Fi, NFC, and Bluetooth gives 
information on where, when, and in which context network connections have been used. Thus, 
considering access to both system and network settings, it was hypothesized to have an effect on MUIPC. 
However, a significant relationship cannot be identified. 
Implications for Research and Practice 
The results have theoretical and practical implications. First, our primary contribution is to investigate 
the relationship between access to personal information and MUIPC. In this study, we examine the 
influence of the four dimensions of access to personal information on MUIPC, of which three are found to 
be significant. Due to the highly significant path coefficients of the influence of access to personal identity, 
location, and device content on MUIPC, we call for a deeper examination of these three dimensions. 
Second, the results of our study show an R² of 0.270 for MUIPC. Thus, 27% of the variance of MUIPC is 
explained by access to personal information. To respond to the call for research investigating antecedents 
and consequences of information privacy concerns (Smith et al. 1996; Stewart and Segars 2002), in the 
mobile context, we recommend considering the construct of access to personal information along with 
further constructs such as prior privacy experience (Smith et al. 1996; Xu et al. 2012a), anxiety (Stewart 
and Segars 2002), and control over personal information (Malhotra et al. 2004; Xu et al. 2012b). Thus, a 
comprehension of mobile users’ privacy concerns could be further enhanced. Third, we recommend 
further research to consider potential distinctions between free and paid apps, which can have an 
influence on users’ privacy concerns. 
From a practical perspective, the results indicate that app providers should recognize access to personal 
information as a significant indicator affecting MUIPC. Hence, asking mobile users for permission to 
access personal information can lead to privacy concerns. These concerns can prevent users from 
installing mobile apps or make them feel uncomfortable, with the result being that they uninstall the 
mobile app (Pew Internet 2012). If app providers understand mobile users’ privacy concerns, they can 
react to them. Access to personal information is one aspect that should be recognized. App providers 
should ensure that they access personal information stored on mobile devices only if necessary and 
justified with value-added services. For example, location should only be tracked if the mobile app 
requires this function to work properly, such as with the navigation system of the Google Maps mobile app. 
In this context, trust is a key aspect to enhance users’ belief to which degree “a firm is dependable in 
protecting consumers’ personal information” (Malhotra et al. 2004, p. 341). Several studies in the field of 
electronic commerce have found trust to have a significant impact on information sharing and purchase 
decisions (e.g., Dinev and Hart 2006; Gefen et al. 2003; McKnight et al. 2002). Within the frame of 
mobile apps, trust can lead users to allow access to personal information and conduct transactions such as 
pay-per-download, in-app purchase, or subscriptions. A trust-based relationship between app providers 
and users can help to build user confidence and overcome privacy concerns. Thus, app users can expect 
safe environments in which app providers act in a regular, honest, and cooperative way. With regard to 
creating a trust-based relationship, several studies have identified various methods, of which different 
privacy assurance approaches have been in the focus of mobile application research for the last three 
years (e.g., Keith et al. 2010; Xu et al. 2010). 
Security and Privacy of Information and IS 
14 Thirty Fourth International Conference on Information Systems, Milan 2013  
Xu et al. (2012b) distinguish between three privacy assurance approaches, i.e., individual self-protection, 
industry self-regulation, and government regulation, all of which have a direct negative influence on 
privacy concerns. That implies that privacy assurances offered by app providers can alleviate mobile users’ 
privacy concerns. The individual self-protection approach allows users to control the access to personal 
information (Xu et al. 2012b), for example by turning off the location tracking from their mobile devices. 
In contrast to Google Android, Apple iOS users can turn off access in the privacy settings if supported by 
the mobile app. Taking this into account, we recommend that app providers offer users the opportunity to 
turn off access to their personal information. App providers should advise users that certain functions of a 
mobile app may not work when doing so, e.g., the navigation system of the Google Maps mobile app will 
not work if location tracking is turned off. Further individual self-protection approaches comprise the 
users’ refusal to provide personal information, misrepresentation of personal information, removal of 
personal information, negative word-of-mouth communication to others, complaining directly to online 
companies, and complaining indirectly to third-party privacy organizations (Son and Kim 2008). For 
example, app users could refuse to provide personal information by abbreviating the names of their 
contacts if the mobile app has access to the contacts stored on the users’ mobile devices. This could 
prevent app providers from linking users’ contacts to information stored on the providers’ databases. The 
industry self-regulation approach “places the responsibility for protecting information privacy in the 
hands of those that gather, use, and sell personal information” (Xu et al. 2010, p. 143). App providers can 
use privacy seals, guarantees, and promises such as privacy policies, which positively influence trusting 
beliefs (Keith et al. 2010). For example, TRUSTe offers a privacy seal program specifically for mobile app 
developers (TRUSTe 2013). We recommend that app providers take privacy seals into account and 
communicate privacy policies to their users, with the result that users can understand why their personal 
identity, location, and device content is accessed by the mobile app. The government regulation approach 
“relies on the judicial and legislative branches of a government agency for protecting personal 
information” (Xu et al. 2010, p. 143). This approach entails that users are protected from misuse and 
breach of privacy laws, which can lead offenders to be punished by law, establishing and maintaining a 
deterrent effect (Xu et al. 2012b). For example, the California Department of Justice introduced a privacy 
law as of October 30, 2012, and requested app developers to “post a privacy policy within their app that 
informs users of what personally identifiable information about them is being collected and what will be 
done with that private information” (California Department of Justice 2012). The implementation of 
privacy policies is even more important considering both industry self-regulation and government 
regulation. Due to the alleviating effect of privacy assurance approaches on privacy concerns, we 
recommend that app providers consider these approaches, i.e., individual self-protection, industry self-
regulation, and government regulation, in particular when accessing users’ personal identity, location, 
and device content. Regarding the importance for practical implications, interdependencies between 
privacy assurances and the access to personal information are promising for further research. 
Limitations and Conclusion 
Like other empirical research, the results should be read within its inherent limitations. Note that all of 
the measures are prone to measurement errors that could affect the results of the analysis, because all of 
the measures are subjective by nature. Therefore, the study is subject to following limitations, which 
present useful opportunities for further research. First, one limitation of this research is found in the fact 
that most of the participants were up to 30 years old, with the majority being younger than 20 years old 
(see Appendix Table A1). Although our participants may fall in the target users for mobile apps, care must 
be taken in any effort to generalize the findings beyond the boundaries of our sample. Some possible 
research approach for the future are possible: Future researchers should repeat this study with a more 
diverse sample for enhanced generalizability and further analyses are required to exclude possible 
confounded impacts of those demographic characteristics on the constructs of this research. 
Second, in terms of generalizability, another bias possibility is self-selection among the survey 
respondents due to several reasons. One reason is that data were collected through an online survey, 
which is liable to a self-selection bias (Kim et al. 2002). In addition, we offered a monetary reward in the 
form of two $25 Amazon vouchers. This could have drawn participants who were more prone to monetary 
incentives, leading to a sampling bias (Hui et al. 2007). Another reason for self-selection bias is that we 
stated in the postings and emails that the topic of the survey is about mobile app privacy. Mobile app 
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users who are more concerned about information privacy might also be those who are more likely to 
respond to the survey (Kankanhalli et al. 2005). 
Third, it cannot be precluded that unacknowledged factors of the overall construct of access to personal 
information are not considered. Culturally driven individual differences are not part of this research 
model. A further limitation is that we conducted the study exclusively in the USA, which has a strong 
reputation in this research context. Thus, the participants may have powerful and well-formed beliefs 
about the access to personal information and privacy concerns. As Smith (2004) pointed out, different 
countries have approached privacy issues differently in various regulatory structures. Furthermore, Chen 
(2008) pointed out that culture has lasting impacts on privacy. Therefore, future research should be 
conducted in other countries to provide further insights into the effects of access to personal information 
and privacy concerns.  
Future studies could expand to include an international context by integrating cultural differences into 
the evaluation of access to personal information and the impact on mobile users’ information privacy 
concerns, taking individual differences into account. Furthermore, qualitative investigations that explore 
and capture the subtleties that cannot be directly measured by quantitative research can be examined in 
further studies. 
In this paper, we presented an initial attempt to investigate the relationship between access to personal 
information and mobile users’ information privacy concerns. Access to personal information was 
categorized into four dimensions: personal identity, location, device content, and system and network 
settings, which were identified by conducting a survey and testing collected data with principal 
component analysis using varimax rotation. Results of a structural equation modeling indicate that access 
to personal identity, location, and device content is significantly positive in relation to mobile users’ 
information privacy concerns. 
Appendix 
Survey Instrument 
Perceived Surveillance: Five-point scales from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” (Xu et al. 2012a) 
(1) I believe that the location of my mobile device is monitored at least part of the time.  
(2) I am concerned that mobile apps are collecting too much information about me.  
(3) I am concerned that mobile apps may monitor my activities on my mobile device. 
 
Perceived Intrusion: Five-point scales from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” (Xu et al. 2008) 
(1) I feel that as a result of my using mobile apps, others know about me more than I am comfortable with.  
(2) I believe that as a result of my using mobile apps, information about me that I consider private is now 
more readily available to others than I would want.  
(3) I feel that as a result of my using mobile apps, information about me is out there that, if used, will 
invade my privacy. 
 
Secondary Use of Personal Information: Five-point scales from “strongly agree” to “strongly 
disagree” (Smith et al. 1996) 
(1) I am concerned that mobile apps may use my personal information for other purposes without 
notifying me or getting my authorization.  
(2) When I give personal information to use mobile apps, I am concerned that apps may use my 
information for other purposes.  
(3) I am concerned that mobile apps may share my personal information with other entities without 
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getting my authorization. 
 
Access to Personal Information: Five-point scales from “extremely high” to “extremely low” (self-
developed) 
How high do you feel the intrusion into your privacy if mobile apps are able to access the following on 
your mobile device? (see Appendix Table A2 - Description Questionnaire for further information on 
indicators) 
Table A1. Demographics 
Gender 
Female 288 60.8% 
Male 166 35.0% 
Missing 20 4.2% 
Age 
≤ 20 274 57.8% 
21 - 30 94 19.8% 
31 - 40 22 4.6% 
41 - 50 19 4.0% 
> 50 45 9.5% 
Missing 20 4.2% 
Profession 
Employed 82 17.3% 
Homemaker 2 0.4% 
Self-employed 14 3.0% 
Student 338 71.3% 
Other 19 4.0% 
Missing 19 4.0% 
Education 
Less than high school 28 5.9% 
High school degree 273 57.6% 
College degree 29 6.1% 
Undergraduate degree 57 12.0% 
Graduate degree 59 12.4% 
Other 8 1.7% 
Missing 20 4.2% 
Income 
≤ $ 20,000 73 15.4% 
$ 20,001 - $ 40,000 39 8.2% 
$ 40,001 - $ 60,000 33 7.0% 
$ 60,001 - $ 100,000 50 10.5% 
> $ 100,000 105 22.2% 
Not specified 152 32.1% 
Missing 22 4.6% 
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Table A2. Results PCA using Varimax Rotation for Access to Personal Information 
Construct Items Description Questionnaire 
Component Cronbach’s 
Alpha 1 2 3 4 
SYS_NET 
SYS_NET 1 Access_Sync_Settings .828       
.948 
SYS_NET 2 Access_Sync_Statistics .812       
SYS_NET 3 Access_Vibrator .812       
SYS_NET 4 Access_Alarm .783       
SYS_NET 5 Access_Network_Connection .780       
SYS_NET 6 Access_System_Settings .779       
SYS_NET 7 Access_Bluetooth .772       
SYS_NET 8 Access_Wi-Fi 757       
SYS_NET 9 Access_Info_Running_Apps .730       
SYS_NET 10 Access_Screen_Lock .642       
SYS_NET 11 Access_NFC .622       
DEV_CON 
DEV_CON 1 Access_Videos   .836     
.918 
DEV_CON 2 Access_Photos   .828     
DEV_CON 3 Access_Call_Logs   .742     
DEV_CON 4 Access_Calendar_Events   .710     
DEV_CON 5 Access_Reminders   .700     
DEV_CON 6 Access_Contacts   .697     
DEV_CON 7 Access_USB_Storage   .691     
DEV_CON 8 Access_Browser_Navi_History   .606     
DEV_CON 9 Access_Browser_Bookmarks   .582     
PERS_ID 
PERS_ID 1 Access_Contact_Information     .864   
.807 PERS_ID 2 Access_Phone_Number     .836   
PERS_ID 3 Access_Name     .746   
LOC 
LOC 1 Access_Approximate_Location       .851 
.860 
LOC 2 Access_Precise_Location       .779 
Rotation Sum of 
Squared 
Loadings 
Total   7.189 5.616 2.361 1.983 
  % Variance   28.756 22.462 9.443 7.933 
Cumulative Variance   28.756 51.218 60.661 68.594 
* Factor loadings less than 0.4 suppressed.           
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